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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this case of first impression, we must decide whether 
a plaintiff who prevails on a claim for bad faith conduct, 
pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8371, may recover 
attorney's fees against an insurer for time spent 
prosecuting the bad faith claim itself, in addition to those 
fees attributable to prosecuting the underlying insurance 
contract claim, under section 8371(3). We conclude that 
such fees may be assessed. 
 
We are also faced with the issue of whether, and under 
what circumstances, a court may enhance a fee under 
Pennsylvania law to reflect the contingent risk of 
nonpayment assumed by the plaintiff 's attorney in 
accepting the case on a contingent-fee basis. We conclude 
that a court may enhance a fee in such circumstances, but 
only to the extent that the enhancement (1) reflects the 
contingent risk of the particular case and (2) is not based 
on factors already considered in calculating the lodestar 
amount. 
 
We will reverse the judgment of the district court in part 
and will remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
After a fire destroyed her home, Regina Polselli sued 
Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company for benefits 
due under her insurance contract with Nationwide and for 
damages under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8371 for 
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Nationwide's alleged bad faith in handling her claims.1 On 
the day of trial, the parties settled Polselli's contract claims 
for building loss, personalty loss, and additional living 
expenses. The court conducted a bench trial on the bad 
faith claim, the only remaining claim. 
 
The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that Nationwide had acted in bad faith with respect to 
Polselli's personalty and living expense claims and awarded 
$90,000 in punitive damages. Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. 
Fire Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.91-1365, 1992 WL 247271 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 23, 1992). The court did not assess attorney's fees at 
that time, or upon motion for reconsideration, because 
Polselli had not presented evidence at trial to establish a 
reasonable assessment. Id., 1992 WL 247271, at *8; Polselli 
v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.91-1365, 1993 
WL 137376, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 1993). 
 
Polselli subsequently filed a Motion to Assess Costs and 
Attorney's Fees accompanied by a verified statement signed 
by Polselli's counsel, Harry P. Begier, Jr. After an 
evidentiary hearing, the court assessed costs and attorney's 
fees against Nationwide. Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., No. CIV.A.91-1365, 1993 WL 479050 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 
1993). Begier submitted a list of billable hours totaling 
346.9 hours, and Nationwide did not dispute the 
reasonableness of this claim. Id., 1993 WL 479050, at *4. 
The court determined that Begier's regular hourly rate was 
$300. The court thus calculated the "lodestar" amount to 
be $104,070 ($300 per hour multiplied by 346.9 hours). 
Finding the case to be unique in that it was based upon the 
"relatively new" Pennsylvania bad faith statute, the court 
concluded that Begier faced a "substantial risk of a minimal 
recovery and [an] extensive number of hours risked . . . 
with no guarantee of remuneration." Id. Citing what it 
called the "closely analogous" provisions of Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 41, S 503, which permit a court to enhance a fee award 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1332. A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the 
substantive law of the state whose laws govern the action. Kleinknecht v. 
Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1365 (3d Cir. 1993). The parties 
agree that Pennsylvania law governs this dispute. 
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based on the "contingency or the certainty of 
compensation," the court found it appropriate to increase 
the lodestar amount by sixty percent, or $62,442. Id. The 
court assessed a total attorney's fee against Nationwide in 
the amount of $166,412. Id. 
 
Nationwide appealed both the merits determination of 
bad faith and the subsequent assessment of fees and costs. 
We reversed the merits determination and remanded for 
application of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard 
to the bad faith claim. Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., 23 F.3d 747, 750-51 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Terletsky 
v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 680, 688 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (bad faith must be proven by clear 
and convincing evidence). We did not reach the issue of 
attorney's fees. 
 
On remand, the district court found that Polselli satisfied 
the higher burden of proof. Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire 
Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.91-1365, 1995 WL 430571 (E.D. Pa. 
July 20, 1995). We affirmed by judgment order. Polselli v. 
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 95-1715 (3d Cir. May 3, 
1996). 
 
Polselli filed a Renewed Motion to Assess Attorney's Fees, 
and the district court heard oral argument on the motion. 
At that time, Nationwide conceded that $300 per hour was 
a reasonable rate for Begier's services.2  Likewise, 
Nationwide did not challenge the hours claimed by Begier. 
Rather, Nationwide argued that section 8371 allows for the 
award of attorney's fees only with respect to those hours 
expended on the underlying insurance contract claim and 
not on the bad faith claim itself. 
 
The district court agreed with Nationwide. The court 
concluded that section 8371 creates a new cause of action, 
independent and distinct from the underlying policy action. 
Further, the court found that "[t]o allow attorney['s] fees for 
prosecuting bad faith claims would reimburse plaintiff for 
costs beyond those necessitated by the insurer's conduct, 
indirectly augmenting the punitive damages already 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We express no view regarding whether $300 per hour is a reasonable 
rate for Begier's services. 
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awarded." Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 
CIV.A.91-1365, 1995 WL 678212, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 
1995). The court assessed fees in favor of Polselli only for 
work related to the insurance contract claims for personalty 
losses and living expenses, and not for the time spent 
litigating the bad faith claim. Id. 
 
The parties subsequently filed a stipulation allocating 
154.9 hours for the time Begier dedicated to the 
contractual claims as to personalty losses and living 
expenses. The revised lodestar amount was therefore 
$46,470 ($300 per hour multiplied by 154.9 hours). 
 
Nationwide also argued that the court should not 
enhance the fee as it did in its November 1993 order. The 
court agreed: "Given the decision not to assess fees for 
work on plaintiff's bad faith claim, the court's earlier 
rationale for enhancing the hourly rate no longer applies." 
Id. The court reasoned that its earlier justification for the 
sixty percent enhancement -- the complexity of the bad 
faith claim and the uncertainty of prevailing on that claim 
-- did not apply to an award of fees premised solely on time 
spent prosecuting a straightforward insurance contract 
claim. Id., 1995 WL 678212, at *2-3. The court assessed 
attorney's fees in the amount of $46,470 against 
Nationwide. 
 
Nationwide appealed from the court's order of attorney's 
fees on the ground that Polselli was not entitled to fees 
because Nationwide had not acted in bad faith in its 
handling of the underlying insurance claims, a position still 
then pending in Nationwide's appeal from the merits of the 
district court's finding of bad faith. Polselli cross-appealed 
from the district court's calculation of the fee assessment. 
When we affirmed the district court's finding of bad faith, 
Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 95-1715 (3d 
Cir. May 3, 1996), Nationwide withdrew its appeal. The only 
matter presently before us is Polselli's appeal from the 
assessment of attorney's fees.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We have jurisdiction over this appeal from afinal order pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. The district court's application and interpretation of 
state 
law is subject to plenary review. Hofkin v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. 
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II. 
 
In 1981, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to 
create a common law "bad faith" cause of action for a 
plaintiff whose insurance company wrongfully refused to 
pay a claim under an insurance policy. D'Ambrosio v. 
Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966 (Pa. 
1981); see also Johnson v. Beane, 664 A.2d 96, 99 n.3 (Pa. 
1995) (there is no common law remedy in Pennsylvania for 
insurer bad faith). In 1990, in what some call a delayed 
response to D'Ambrosio, the Pennsylvania legislature 
enacted 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8371, entitled "Actions on 
Insurance Policies." The statute reads as follows: 
 
       In an action arising under an insurance policy, if the 
       court finds that the insurer has acted in bad faith 
       toward the insured, the court may take all of the 
       following actions: 
 
       (1) Award interest on the amount of the claim from 
       the date the claim was made by the insured in an 
       amount equal to the prime rate of interest plus 3%. 
 
       (2) Award punitive damages against the insurer. 
 
       (3) Assess court costs and attorney fees against the 
       insurer. 
 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8371. In this case of first 
impression, we must decide whether a cause of action for 
bad faith under section 8371 is itself an "action arising 
under an insurance policy." 
 
Although the issue of whether a section 8371 cause of 
action arises under an insurance policy is an open 
question, in other contexts a Pennsylvania intermediate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Co., 81 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 1996). In the absence of any precedent of 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, we must predict how that court would 
decide this issue. Winterberg v. Transportation Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 318, 
321-22 (3d Cir. 1995). In predicting how the state supreme court would 
rule on the issue, we should give intermediate appellate court decisions 
"significant weight in the absence of an indication that the highest state 
court would rule otherwise." City of Phila. v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 
112, 123 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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appellate court has held that claims brought under section 
8371 are "distinct from the underlying contractual 
insurance claims from which the dispute arose." Nealy v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 695 A.2d 790, 792 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1997) (deciding that unlike contract cause of 
action, "distinct" bad faith cause of action could not be 
decided by arbitration panel but had to be decided by 
court); accord March v. Paradise Mut. Ins. Co., 646 A.2d 
1254, 1256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (deciding that bad faith 
cause of action was not barred by policy's limitations clause 
since it was "separate and distinct" from underlying 
contract cause of action, which was barred); Romano v. 
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 646 A.2d 1228, 1231 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1994) (permitting "separate and distinct" bad 
faith cause of action to be based on alleged violation of 
Unfair Insurance Practices Act); see also Winterberg v. 
Transportation Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 318, 326 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(noting that "Pennsylvania case law shows an intent to 
allow a separate action on the `bad faith' statute"). 
 
Section 8371 provides an "independent cause of action to 
an insured that is not dependant upon success on the 
merits, or trial at all, of the contract claim." Nealy, 695 
A.2d at 793; accord March, 646 A.2d at 1256 (insured's 
claim for bad faith is "independent of the resolution of the 
underlying contract claim"); Doylestown Elec. Supply Co. v. 
Maryland Cas. Ins. Co., 942 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) (insured may bring bad faith claim prior to resolution 
of contract dispute). While not obvious from the language of 
section 8371, it is apparent that Pennsylvania courts have 
interpreted section 8371 to create "a cause of action that 
exists separately and independently from a claim on the 
insurance contract itself." Winterberg, 72 F.3d at 326. 
 
Nationwide argues, and the district court agreed, that 
since a section 8371 cause of action is separate and 
distinct from the cause of action to obtain benefits due 
under the policy, the section 8371 cause of action is not an 
"action arising under an insurance policy" and fees may not 
be awarded for the time spent litigating the bad faith claim. 
We conclude, however, that the separate and independent 
cause of action for bad faith is still an action"arising under 
an insurance policy" such that attorney's fees may be 
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awarded for time spent litigating the issue of bad faith. We 
reach this conclusion for three reasons: (1) the bad faith 
cause of action depends on the existence of a predicate 
contract cause of action; (2) the bad faith cause of action 
enables an insured to enforce an insurer's implicit 
contractual duty of good faith; and (3) assessment of 
attorney's fees for time spent prosecuting the bad faith 
cause of action is necessary to fulfill the "make whole" 
purpose of section 8371(3). 
 
Initially, we observe that under the plain language of the 
statute, it is reasonably clear that a section 8371 claim may 
not be the sole claim of an insured. Section 8371 provides 
that "[i]n an action arising under an insurance policy, if the 
court finds that the insurer has acted in bad faith toward 
the insured, the court may take all of the following actions 
. . . ." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8371. This language implies 
that a determination of bad faith is merely an additional 
finding to be made in a predicate action arising under an 
insurance policy. Absent a predicate action to enforce some 
right under an insurance policy, an insured may not sue an 
insurer for bad faith conduct in the abstract. 
 
In Winterberg, the district court concluded that the bad 
faith claim "must be related to at least one other colorable 
claim over which the court has jurisdiction." Winterberg v. 
CNA Ins. Co., 868 F. Supp. 713, 722 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff'd, 
72 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 1995). The court reasoned that "[h]ad 
the legislature wanted to allow a person wronged by his or 
her insurance company to sue directly, and only, under 
[section] 8371, surely it would not have used the language 
it did." Id. at 722 n.13 (emphasis in original). We agree. 
Instead of creating a cause of action for bad faith conduct 
that can exist in a vacuum, the Pennsylvania legislature 
provided an insured with additional remedies upon a 
finding of bad faith made in a predicate action under an 
insurance policy. 
 
Of course, an insured may list the section 8371 cause of 
action and the contract cause of action as separate counts 
in the same complaint. E.g., Boring v. Erie Ins. Group, 641 
A.2d 1189, 1190 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Doylestown, 942 F. 
Supp. at 1020 (noting that courts interpreting section 8371 
have "consistently entertained multi-count complaints 
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containing both unresolved insurance contract disputes 
and bad faith claims"). An insured may also, as Polselli did 
here, settle the claim under the policy and proceed to trial 
on the bad faith claim alone. Indeed, the bad faith claim 
may remain viable even if the insured fails to file suit on 
the predicate policy claim within the period required by the 
policy. March, 646 A.2d at 1256-57; accord Margolies v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 810 F. Supp. 637, 641-42 (E.D. 
Pa. 1992). At the very least, however, the predicate policy 
cause of action must be ripe before a section 8371 cause of 
action may be recognized. Doylestown, 942 F. Supp. at 
1019-20 (so long as claim under insurance policy is ripe for 
judicial determination, bad faith issue is also ripe); see also 
Nealy, 695 A.2d at 793, 794 n.4 (bad faith claim runs 
"parallel" to contractual claim and can be "brought 
contemporaneously with or subsequent to" the contractual 
claim); March, 646 A.2d at 1256 ("[S]ection 8371 provides 
relief only in actions `arising under' an insurance policy 
. . . . [Section] 8371 was promulgated to provide additional 
relief to insureds . . . .") (emphasis supplied).4 
 
Next, we conclude that since an insurer's duty of good 
faith toward an insured is implicit in every insurance 
policy, an action to enforce that duty must necessarily 
"arise under" that policy. There is no common law private 
remedy for bad faith conduct, but the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has long recognized that an insurer must 
act with the "utmost" good faith toward its insured. Fedas 
v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 151 A. 285, 286 (Pa. 1930); accord 
Dercoli v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 554 A.2d 906, 
909 (Pa. 1989) (insurer was "bound" to act in good faith 
toward the insured). In Romano v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., 646 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), the court 
concluded that an insurer's duty of good faith exists 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In the ordinary case, the insured's insurance contract cause of action 
and bad faith cause of action may be brought in the same action. It may 
be, however, that an insured is unable to bring the contract action due 
to the running of the applicable limitations period. See, e.g., March, 646 
A.2d at 1256. In that case, the insured should indicate that the 
predicate contract cause of action, which was viable at one time, may 
not now be brought due to the running of the applicable limitations 
period. 
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"because of the special relationship between an insurer and 
its insured and the very nature of the insurance contract. 
The insurer's duty of good faith, therefore, is contractual 
and arises because the insurance company assumes a 
fiduciary status by virtue of the policy's provisions which 
give the insurer the right to handle claims and control 
settlement." Id. at 1231. 
 
In Okkerse v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 
663 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), the court held that section 8371 
applied so long as the alleged bad faith conduct occurred 
after the effective date of section 8371, even though the 
insurance contract was entered into prior to the effective 
date of the section. Id. at 664. The court reasoned: 
 
        [The insurer's] obligations under the policy issued 
       prior to the effective date of section 8371 have not been 
       changed. Section 8371 also does not affect either the 
       terms of the insurance contract or the vested rights 
       thereunder. It merely prohibits an insurer from 
       engaging in a bad faith refusal to pay benefits due 
       under the policy. An insurer did not have a right to act 
       in bad faith toward its insured prior to the statute's 
       enactment. Thus, it is clear that the statute is not 
       being applied retroactively in this case. 
 
Id. at 665-66 (citations and footnote omitted, emphasis 
supplied); see also Seeger by Seeger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 776 
F. Supp. 986, 988 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (there is no contractual 
right to act in bad faith); Coyne v. Allstate Ins. Co., 771 F. 
Supp. 673, 675 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (insurer "never had the 
right to act in bad faith toward the insured"). 
 
In Winterberg v. Transportation Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 318 (3d 
Cir. 1995), we held that a workers' compensation claim is 
not "based on an insurance policy" within the meaning of 
section 8371: 
 
       The [workers' compensation] claim is statutory and has 
       its genesis in the contract of hire between the employer 
       and employee, see, [Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77, S 431], not 
       an insurance contract. The employer's obligation to pay 
       for a compensable injury is not predicated on an 
       insurance policy. 
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 Id. at 325 n.4. In contrast, while a section 8371 bad faith 
claim itself is created by statute, the claim has its genesis 
in the policy of insurance. The insurer's duty of good faith 
toward an insured is predicated on the fiduciary 
relationship created at the inception of the contract 
between the parties. In other words, but for the insurance 
policy, Nationwide would not owe a duty of good faith to 
Polselli. The fact that Polselli's ability to enforce that duty 
was altered by statute does not change the fact that the 
duty itself arose by contract. 
 
In deciding whether a section 8371 action "arises under" 
an insurance policy, we should determine where the 
insured's rights at issue arose, not whether the policy itself 
permits the insured to enforce those rights. In this case, a 
section 8371 action is brought to enforce an insured's right 
to be free from the bad faith conduct of the insurer. That 
right is inherent in every insurance policy, and it therefore 
"arises under" the insurance policy. The fact that the 
enforcement mechanism is statutory is of no consequence.5 
 
Finally, an award of attorney's fees under section 8371 is 
meant "to compensate the plaintiff for having to pay an 
attorney to get that to which [the plaintiff was] 
contractually entitled. Along with interest, costs and delay 
damages, the object of an attorney fee award is to make the 
successful plaintiff completely whole." Klinger v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 1997). In 
this case, Nationwide's bad faith conduct forced Polselli to 
incur attorney's fees to obtain the benefits due under the 
insurance policy. To be made "completely whole," therefore, 
Polselli needed to obtain those fees from Nationwide. To 
obtain those fees, however, Polselli was required to incur 
additional attorney's fees to prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that Nationwide acted in bad faith. In other 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Our view is informed by reference to the Pennsylvania legislature's use 
of the phrase "arising under" in other contexts. For example, Pa. R. Civ. 
P. 2207 is captioned "Actions Arising Under Foreign Law." Rule 2207 
deals with actions brought "to enforce rights arising under the laws of 
some other jurisdiction." Pa. R. Civ. P. 2207 (emphasis supplied). Thus, 
in this context, an "action to enforce rights arising under [X]" is itself 
an 
"action arising under [X]." 
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words, to obtain the fees necessary to make Polselli whole, 
Polselli was required to incur additional fees. 
 
This is not a traditional fee-shifting statute where a 
prevailing party may be automatically entitled to a 
reasonable fee. An insured is not entitled to recover her fees 
merely because she prevails on her claim to enforce the 
policy; rather, the insured must also prevail on the bad 
faith claim. The Pennsylvania rules of statutory 
construction state that, in general, the "provisions of a 
statute shall be liberally construed to effect their objects 
and to promote justice." 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1928(c). 
The narrow construction of section 8371 proposed by 
Nationwide runs counter to this rule. If Polselli was unable 
to obtain the fees incurred in proving Nationwide's bad 
faith, Polselli would never be made whole and the purpose 
of section 8371(3) would be thwarted.6  
 
We predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
conclude that, upon a finding of bad faith conduct by clear 
and convincing evidence, a trial court may assess attorney's 
fees against an insured for the time spent (1) litigating the 
claim under the policy and (2) litigating the bad faith claim 
itself.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Cf. In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig. , 120 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
In Tutu Wells, the district court imposed heavy sanctions upon a law 
firm, several of its partners, and its client for discovery violations in 
connection with an environmental lawsuit. The court also imposed the 
sum of $120,000 on the law firm as counsel fees and costs incurred by 
the moving parties for the time they spent in connection with the 
underlying sanctions proceedings. We affirmed the award of counsel fees 
and costs. We reasoned: 
 
       The time, effort, and resources expended in bringing sanctionable 
       conduct to light would have been unnecessary had the sanctionable 
       conduct never occurred. These costs are as much a harm to a party 
       in the litigation as is the delay in the litigation or the 
substantive 
       prejudice caused by the conduct. If we exclude from a possible 
       award the costs of sanctions proceedings, we would undermine the 
       compensatory goal of a sanctions award. 
 
Id. at 388. 
 
7. We recognize that some other jurisdictions draw a distinction between 
fees incurred by an insured to obtain benefits due under a policy and 
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III. 
 
Section 8371 does not provide any guidance on how a 
trial court should calculate a reasonable attorney's fee.8 
Courts deciding cases under Pennsylvania law are guided 
by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1716 when 
considering the amount of a reasonable fee: 
 
       In all cases where the court is authorized under 
       applicable law to fix the amount of counsel fees it shall 
       consider, among other things, the following factors: 
 
       (1) the time and effort reasonably expended by the 
       attorney in the litigation; 
 
       (2) the quality of the services rendered; 
 
       (3) the results achieved and benefits conferred upon 
       the class or upon the public; 
 
       (4) the magnitude, complexity and uniqueness of the 
       litigation; and 
 
       (5) whether the receipt of a fee was contingent on 
       success. 
 
Pa. R. Civ. P. 1716.9 The district court did not rely on Rule 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
those incurred in prosecuting a bad faith claim against the insurer to 
obtain damages that are not included in the policy benefits. See, e.g., 
Bernhard v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 885 P.2d 265, 271-72 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1994), aff'd, 915 P.2d 1285 (Colo. 1996); Schwartz v. Farmers Ins. Co. 
of Ariz., 800 P.2d 20, 22-23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); Brandt v. Superior 
Court, 693 P.2d 796, 798-800 (Cal. 1985); see also Kirchoff v. American 
Cas. Co., of Reading, Pa., 997 F.2d 401, 406-07 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(predicting South Dakota law). Other jurisdictions allow a successful 
plaintiff to recover fees for time spent preparing and trying a bad faith 
claim. See, e.g., Thompson v. Shelter Mut. Ins., 875 F.2d 1460, 1463-64 
(10th Cir. 1989) (predicting Oklahoma law). 
 
8. Like costs, attorney's fees under section 8371(3) may be assessed after 
a finding of bad faith is made at the conclusion of trial. It is not 
necessary for an insured's attorney to introduce evidence of attorney's 
fees and costs at trial; rather, such evidence may be considered upon 
motion following trial. 
 
9. Before the adoption of Rule 1716, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
instructed trial courts to consider, inter alia, the amount of work 
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1716; it looked instead to Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 41,S 503, 
which permits borrowers and debtors who prevail in usury 
actions against their lenders to recover a "reasonable 
amount for attorney's fee." Id. S 503(a). In determining the 
amount of a section 503 fee, the court may consider: 
 
       (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and 
       difficulty of the questions involved and the skill 
       requisite properly to conduct the case; 
 
       (2) the customary charges of the members of the bar 
       for similar services; 
 
       (3) the amount involved in the controversy and the 
       benefits resulting to the client or clients from the 
       services; and 
 
       (4) the contingency or the certainty of the 
       compensation. 
 
Id. S 503(b).10 
 
The question of what standard to apply in calculating 
attorney's fees and costs is a legal question and is subject 
to plenary review. While section 503 and Rule 1716 are 
similar, the district court should have looked to Rule 1716 
in calculating a reasonable fee. Ultimately, however, we are 
not concerned with the specific list of factors the district 
court cited when it calculated the fee in this case. Rather, 
we turn to the task of determining whether the fees 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
performed, the character of the services rendered, the difficulty of the 
problems involved, the importance of the litigation, the amount of money 
or value of the property in question, and the results the attorney was 
able to obtain. In re Trust Estate of LaRocca, 246 A.2d 337, 339 (Pa. 
1968). 
 
10. Contrary to Polselli's assertion, a court assessing a section 503 fee 
is 
not required to enhance a fee based on the contingency or the certainty 
of compensation. Indeed, whether the court even considers contingency 
is a matter within the court's discretion. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, S 503 
(court "may" consider contingency). Even under Rule 1716, where 
consideration of contingency is required, a district court need not 
actually enhance a fee based on contingency. 
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assessed are, under the circumstances of the case,  
"reasonable."11 
 
A. 
 
We will affirm the judgment of the district court insofar 
as it assessed attorney's fees in the amount of $46,470 
against Nationwide for the time Begier spent litigating the 
contract claim. The district court first calculated the 
lodestar amount based on the stipulated hourly rate for 
Begier's work in non-contingency matters and stipulated 
number of hours allocated to the contract claim. 12 
Assuming that an enhancement for contingent risk was 
permissible, see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 41,S 503(b)(4), the court 
considered a myriad of factors in an effort to determine 
whether it was appropriate to enhance the lodestar amount 
to account for the contingency or certainty of the 
compensation. The court found that the contract claim was 
not unique or complex, and that it did not entail a 
substantial risk of failure. Thus, the court concluded that 
a contingency enhancement was not appropriate for the 
time Begier spent litigating the contract claim. Polselli v. 
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.91-1365, 1995 WL 
678212, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1995). We will not 
interfere with the district court's exercise of discretion. On 
remand, the district court should not reconsider the fee 
award relating to prosecution of the contract claim. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. If the correct legal standards are applied and the findings of fact 
are 
not clearly erroneous, the reasonableness of a fee award is reviewed only 
for abuse of discretion. Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1219 (3d 
Cir. 1995); accord In re Trust Estate of LaRocca, 246 A.2d 337, 339 (Pa. 
1968); Commonwealth v. PBS Coals, Inc., 677 A.2d 868, 870 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct.) ("award of attorney's fees and costs is within the discretion 
of the trial court, whose discretion will not be disturbed on appeal 
absent abuse of discretion"), appeal denied, 686 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1996); 
Shaw by Ingram v. Bradley, 672 A.2d 331, 332 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). 
 
12. The "lodestar" amount is a product of the number of attorney hours 
reasonably expended on the particular case and the reasonable hourly 
rate of compensation for the attorney's services. Adjustments to the 
lodestar amount are made as appropriate. While the Pennsylvania state 
courts have not yet embraced the lodestar method, we believe that the 
factors considered in Rule 1716 are implicitly taken into account in the 
lodestar method. 
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B. 
 
We turn now to the district court's task on remand. 
Before it decided that Polselli was unable to recover 
attorney's fees for the time spent litigating the bad faith 
cause of action, the district court found that the bad faith 
claim was based on a relatively new statute, that there was 
little guidance from the statute or the caselaw, and that 
Polselli faced a high risk of no recovery on the bad faith 
claim. Citing section 503, the court increased the lodestar 
amount by sixty percent to account for the "the contingency 
or the certainty of the compensation." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, 
S 503(b)(4). Since the district court later eliminated the 
enhancement when it determined that fees were 
unavailable for the bad faith claim, we are not in a position 
to review a final order of the district court imposing 
attorney's fees calculated with a contingency enhancement. 
We write further only to provide the district court with 
some guidance in the hope that this case, which began 
almost seven years ago and which has reached our court 
for decision three times, will soon draw to a close. 
 
Initially, we are reminded that a trial court in a section 
8371 action "may" assess attorney's fees and costs against 
an insurer upon a finding of bad faith, but it need not 
award such fees. The decision to assess attorney's fees and 
costs against an insured upon a finding of bad faith is 
wholly within the discretion of the trial court, whose 
discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse of 
discretion. Thus, if a district court exercises its discretion 
to assess fees for time spent litigating the contract cause of 
action, but not the time spent litigating the bad faith cause 
of action, or if it elects not to assess any fees at all, we will 
not disturb that decision absent abuse of discretion.13 
 
Should the district court on remand elect to assess 
attorney's fees against Nationwide for the time spent 
litigating the bad faith claim, it must apply the proper legal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Our ability to review, and reverse, the district court's decision not 
to 
assess fees on Polselli's bad faith cause of action rests on the court's 
legal error in concluding that such fees may not be awarded as a matter 
of law. Had the court elected not to assess such fees as a matter of 
discretion, we could not have interfered with that decision. 
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standards in calculating such fees. Rule 1716 instructs the 
court to consider, inter alia, the magnitude, complexity and 
uniqueness of the litigation, and whether the receipt of a 
fee was contingent on success. Polselli asserts that the 
district court should consider two manifestations of 
contingency enhancement: (1) an enhancement to take into 
account the complexity and risk of Polselli's bad faith claim 
against Nationwide; and (2) an enhancement to reflect the 
risk of contingency-fee cases as a class. Nationwide 
contends that contingency enhancement is impermissible in 
any context. Absent guidance from the Pennsylvania courts 
on these issues, we predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would limit the use of contingency enhancements 
that reflect the risk of the particular contingency litigation 
and that it would reject the use of contingency 
enhancements that reflect the risk of contingency-fee cases 
as a class. 
 
1. 
 
In City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992), the 
Supreme Court held that the fee-shifting provisions of two 
federal statutes do not permit enhancement of a fee beyond 
the lodestar amount to reflect the fact that the prevailing 
party's attorneys were retained on a contingent-fee basis. 
The Court rejected the argument that "a `reasonable' fee for 
attorneys who have been retained on a contingency-fee 
basis must go beyond the lodestar, to compensate for risk 
of loss and of consequent nonpayment." Id. at 562. 
 
The Court first rejected the use of contingency 
enhancements that reflect the risk of no recovery in a 
particular case. The Court concluded that an "enhancement 
for contingency would likely duplicate in substantial part 
factors already subsumed in the lodestar." Id. The Court 
reasoned that the attorney's contingent risk of no recovery 
in a particular case is the product of (1) the legal and 
factual merits of the claim and (2) the difficulty of 
establishing those merits. Id. 
 
Rejecting the encouragement of attorneys to bring 
nonmeritorious claims, the Court noted that thefirst factor 
should not be considered in calculating a reasonable fee. Id. 
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at 563. In other words, the risk of no recovery in a case is 
high if the legal and/or factual merits of the case are low. 
In this context, to enhance a fee award based on degree of 
risk would encourage attorneys to bring nonmeritorious 
claims -- clearly not an objective of the typical fee-shifting 
statute. Id. 
 
The Court noted that the second risk factor -- difficulty 
and complexity -- is ordinarily reflected in the lodestar, 
"either in the higher number of hours expended to 
overcome the difficulty, or in the higher hourly rate of the 
attorney skilled and experienced enough to do so." Id. at 
562. Taking into account the complexity or difficulty of a 
case would, therefore, ordinarily amount to double counting 
and would skew the calculation of a "reasonable" rate. Id. 
at 563. 
 
The Supreme Court concluded that a contingency 
enhancement based on the attorney's contingent risk in a 
given case is unwarranted. Were this case based on a 
federal fee-shifting statute, we would instruct the district 
court pursuant to Dague not to consider the contingent risk 
Begier accepted when he agreed to pursue Polselli's bad 
faith claim against Nationwide. 
 
Since this case is governed by Pennsylvania law, 
however, we must predict whether the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would permit consideration of the 
contingent risk of a particular case in calculating a 
reasonable fee for that case. We conclude that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would permit such 
consideration in a bad faith claim under section 8371. 
 
The federal fee-shifting statutes considered in Dague did 
not provide for consideration of contingent risk. If those 
statutes did require district courts to consider contingent 
risk, we believe that Dague would have been decided 
differently. The Dague majority found no justification for 
recognizing a common law enhancement for contingent risk; 
a statutory provision requiring consideration of 
enhancement would have been quite another matter. 
 
Unlike courts assessing fees under the federal fee-shifting 
statutes like those considered in Dague, courts assessing 
fees under section 8371 are guided by Pennsylvania Rule of 
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Civil Procedure 1716. Rule 1716 provides that courts shall 
consider, among other things, the magnitude, complexity 
and uniqueness of the litigation and whether the receipt of 
a fee was contingent on success. Pa. R. Civ. P. 1716. Thus, 
even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was persuaded by 
Dague, it would be bound by Rule 1716. 
 
While we predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would permit courts to consider a case's contingent risk 
when calculating a reasonable fee, we also predict that the 
court would conclude that a contingency enhancement 
would not apply in every case. As the Supreme Court 
reasoned in Dague, a contingency enhancement often will 
duplicate factors already subsumed in the lodestar amount. 
For example, a difficult case may require a high number of 
hours dedicated to research or discovery. Or, it might 
require the skills of someone who ordinarily bills at a high 
hourly rate. Both of these factors are considered in 
calculating the lodestar amount, and they should not be 
reconsidered in enhancing the lodestar. 
 
We predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
permit a trial court to enhance the lodestar amount to 
account for a particular case's contingent risk only to the 
extent that those factors creating the risk are not already 
taken into account when calculating the lodestar amount. 
Thus, when a trial court is faced with a request to enhance 
a fee based on contingent risk arising from the magnitude, 
complexity and uniqueness of the litigation, the court 
should exercise caution so as not to skew the calculation of 
a reasonable rate by double counting. For example, if the 
complexity of a case is reflected in the high number of 
hours researching the complex issues or in the relatively 
high regular hourly rate of the attorney, complexity does 
not justify a contingency enhancement. 
 
The court should also consider whether the attorney was 
able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment. For example, an 
attorney who has entered into a contingency-fee contract in 
a suit seeking substantial damages has significantly 
mitigated the contingent risk; in exchange for accepting the 
risk of nonpayment, the attorney obtains the prospect of 
compensation under the agreement substantially in excess 
of the lodestar amount. Likewise, "attorneys who are paid a 
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portion of their reasonable hourly fee irrespective of result 
have partially mitigated the risk of nonpayment." Rendine v. 
Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202, 1229 (N.J. 1995). 
 
We emphasize that the determination of a reasonable fee 
is an inherently case-specific endeavor. Just as every case 
is unique, so too are the particularized risks faced by 
attorneys accepting contingency-fee cases. We are therefore 
reluctant to provide courts with a specific list of factors to 
consider in determining whether and to what extent a 
contingency enhancement is appropriate in any given case. 
When applying Rule 1716, courts must consider whether 
the receipt of a fee was contingent on success. Courts must 
not, however, deviate from their ultimate responsibility -- 
the calculation of a "reasonable" fee. To the extent that the 
factors creating a contingent risk in a particular case are 
mitigated or are already taken into account when 
calculating the lodestar amount, a contingency 
enhancement is not "reasonable" and should not be 
applied. 
 
In Rendine, the New Jersey Supreme Court departed from 
Dague and established a rule favoring the award of 
contingency enhancements to prevailing parties under the 
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. The court held 
that "a counsel fee awarded under a fee-shifting statute 
cannot be `reasonable' unless the lodestar, calculated as if 
the attorney's compensation were guaranteed irrespective of 
result, is adjusted to reflect the actual risk that the 
attorney will not receive payment if the suit does not 
succeed." Rendine, 661 A.2d at 1228. The court focused on 
risk of attorney non-payment, and it recognized that such 
risk will vary with the circumstances of each unique case. 
The court concluded that "contingency enhancements in 
fee-shifting cases ordinarily should range betweenfive and 
fifty-percent of the lodestar fee, with the enhancement in 
typical contingency cases ranging between twenty and 
thirty-five percent of the lodestar." Id. at 1231. We believe 
that our prediction of Pennsylvania law is not significantly 
different from the statement of New Jersey law in Rendine. 
See, e.g., id. at 1228 (acknowledging concern about 
overpayment and double counting). 
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2. 
 
Polselli also contends that the district court should have 
considered a contingency enhancement to account for the 
riskiness of contingency-fee cases as a class. In her 
concurring opinion in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley 
Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987) 
(Delaware Valley II), Justice O'Connor wrote that 
contingency enhancements should not be based on the 
particular risks of an individual case, but rather should be 
based on the risk of loss in the "class" of case. Id. at 731 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). In Dague, the Court rejected 
this theory of enhancement. Dague, 505 U.S. at 563-65.14 
In Rendine, the New Jersey Supreme Court also rejected 
the view that "all contingent-fee cases should be treated as 
a class, without distinction based on their specific 
circumstances." Rendine, 661 A.2d at 1229. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Polselli draws our attention to Black Grievance Comm. v. Philadelphia 
Elec. Co., 690 F. Supp. 1393 (E.D. Pa. 1988). In Black, the district court 
awarded a 200 percent contingency enhancement in an employment 
discrimination action. That court followed the reasoning of Delaware 
Valley II, and it placed special emphasis on Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion in that 4-1-4 decision. Black , 690 F. Supp. at 1398 
(citing Delaware Valley II, 483 U.S. at 731 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 
The district court found that "the market compensates for contingency 
cases at a rate of approximately 200% and that it would be significantly 
more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain counsel willing to handle 
employment discrimination class actions if plaintiff's counsel had no 
prospect of receiving a contingency enhancer." Black, 690 F. Supp. at 
1401. 
 
While Polselli relies heavily on Black, she fails to mention that in 
Dague, the Supreme Court expressly rejected Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion in Delaware Valley II, and concluded that a 
contingency-fee enhancement was never appropriate under the fee- 
shifting statutes at issue. Dague, 505 U.S. at 563-67. If the district 
court 
decided Black today, the court would have concluded that a contingency 
enhancement was not appropriate in that case. 
 
We are reminded that Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 28.3(b) 
provides that for each legal proposition supported by citations in the 
argument, "counsel shall cite to any opposing authority if such authority 
is binding on this Court, e.g., U.S. Supreme Court decisions . . . ." 3d 
Cir. R. 28.3(b) (emphasis supplied). 
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Trial courts are charged with the duty to attempt to 
calculate a "reasonable" fee in a particular case. To 
consider the risk of contingency fee cases as a class skews 
that calculation. Recognizing the individualized inquiry 
necessary to the calculation of a "reasonable" fee, we 
predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would reject 
the argument that trial courts may enhance a lodestar 
amount to account for the riskiness of contingency-fee 
cases as a class.15 
 
Similarly, we predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would not permit trial courts to enhance a lodestar 
amount to account for the purported riskiness of a more 
limited class of contingency-fee cases (e.g., insurance cases 
"as a class" or civil rights cases "as a class"). To the extent 
that it is permitted at all, enhancement must be based on 
the specific risks of the specific case. 
 
Polselli also contends that Begier's "contingent-fee billing 
rate" is approximately double his non-contingent fee billing 
rate, and that the district court should use his "contingent- 
fee billing rate" in the calculation of a reasonable fee. This 
argument ignores the reality of the contingency agreement. 
By its very nature, contingent litigation entails an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. In Romano by Romano v. Lubin, 530 A.2d 487 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court reasoned: 
 
       It must also be noted that attorneys often accept cases on a 
       contingent fee basis which result in no recovery. The lawyer not 
only 
       does not get paid, he will lose the money he has advanced the 
client 
       to pay for the costs of the suit. When the court calculates the fee 
of 
       a plaintiff 's attorney, it must consider that the very same 
attorney 
       may have spent thousands of uncompensated hours working on 
       other cases. A single recovery may constitute the better portion of 
       his yearly income. 
 
Id. at 488. We predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not 
agree with this reasoning. Fee-shifting statutes"were not designed as a 
form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of lawyers." Dague, 
505 U.S. at 563 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' 
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (Delaware Valley I)). An 
attorney's inability to obtain fees in unrelated cases should have no 
bearing on the attorney's "reasonable fee" in the case in which he is 
successful. 
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agreement whereby a client agrees to pay an attorney a 
certain percentage of any money recovered by settlement or 
judgment. It does not entail an agreement whereby a client 
agrees to pay an attorney a fee of double his non- 
contingency hourly rate if the plaintiff is successful. Thus, 
while a reasonable fee is to be calculated "according to the 
prevailing market rates," Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 
1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990), there is "no such thing as a 
prevailing market rate in contingent litigation." 2 Mary 
Frances Derfner & Arthur D. Wolf, Court Awarded Attorney 
Fees P 16.04[4], at 16-140 (rev. ed. 1997). It may be true 
that an attorney's fee in a contingent-fee case is often 
mathematically equivalent to twice the fee the attorney 
would have received if the attorney billed at the attorney's 
non-contingent regular hourly rate. It does not follow that 
the attorney's contingent fee "rate" is equal to double the 
attorney's non-contingent fee "rate." 
 
On remand, the district court may elect to assess 
attorney's fees against Nationwide for the time Begier spent 
litigating Polselli's bad faith claim. If it chooses to assess 
such fees, the court may consider the possibility of 
enhancing those fees to reflect the contingent risk posed by 
this particular case. In considering this possibility, the 
court should not consider any factor already taken into 
account in calculating the lodestar amount nor should the 
court consider the risk posed by contingent-fee cases as a 
class. 
 
IV. 
 
Polselli also contends that the district court may assess 
fees against Nationwide for the time Begier spent preparing 
and litigating the fee petition itself. It is well-settled that 
under federal law, "the time expended by attorneys in 
obtaining a reasonable fee is justifiably included in the 
attorneys' fee application, and in the court's fee award." 
Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(explaining that a contrary holding would "not comport with 
the purpose behind most statutory fee authorizations"); 
Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Windall, 51 
F.3d 1179, 1190 (3d Cir. 1995) ("legal services rendered in 
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a dispute over the attorneys' fees due a prevailing plaintiff 
are recoverable under a fee shifting statute"). 
 
Pennsylvania courts have carved out a narrow exception 
to this general rule, concluding that an attorney may not 
recover fees for time spent preparing and litigating a fee 
petition when such efforts are directed solely to the benefit 
of the attorney and not the client. Weidner v. Workmen's 
Comp. Appeal Bd., 442 A.2d 242, 245 (Pa. 1982). In 
Weidner, a workmen's compensation claimant had a 
contingent fee agreement with his attorney whereby there 
would be no fee if the claimant did not receive an award. 
Although the attorney successfully resisted suspension of 
the claimant's benefits, there was no additional award; 
hence, the attorney was not entitled to any fee from the 
claimant. When the attorney later successfully pursued 
statutory fees under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the 
claimant had no interest in the fee litigation because the 
outcome of that litigation did not impact the claimant's 
obligation to pay his attorney. Thus, the attorney was not 
entitled to recover fees for the time the attorney spent 
seeking fees on his own behalf. See Allums v. Workmen's 
Comp. Appeal Bd., 532 A.2d 549, 551-52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1987) (discussing Weidner). 
 
Reasonable fees incurred in the course of fee petition 
preparation and litigation may be recovered, however, as 
long as the client has a material interest in the fee 
litigation. Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr. v. Workmen's Comp. 
Appeal Bd., 659 A.2d 1067, 1070-71 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1995); Allums, 532 A.2d at 552 (attorney is entitled to fees 
when work is on behalf of client's interests).16 We believe 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. In American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Zion & Klein, P.A., 489 A.2d 259 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), the court stated that an award of counsel fees "is 
not usually intended to include reimbursement for fees and expenses 
incurred in proceedings to recover such attorney's fees." Id. at 262 
(citing 
Weidner, 442 A.2d 242). Weidner did not stand for this proposition; 
rather, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court merely held that an attorney 
may not recover fees for time spent solely for the benefit of the attorney 
and not the client. Weidner, 442 A.2d at 245. We predict that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would choose not to follow Zion & Klein, 
and would instead adopt the "material interest" test of Milton S. Hershey 
Medical Center, 659 A.2d at 1070-71. 
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that a client has a material interest in the outcome of the 
fee proceedings when those proceedings could affect the 
client's duty to pay her attorney. See Milton S. Hershey, 659 
A.2d at 1070-71. We leave it to the district court to 
determine whether Polselli had a material interest in the 
outcome of the fee proceedings. If she did have a material 
interest in those proceedings, the court may, in its 
discretion, assess a reasonable attorney's fee for the time 
Begier spent preparing and litigating the fee petition.17 
 
V. 
 
In Klinger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 230 
(3d Cir. 1997), the district court denied attorney's fees to a 
successful section 8371 plaintiff because it believed that 
the insurer "had been punished enough" by the punitive 
damages already awarded. Reasoning that punitive 
damages are awarded to punish the defendant for bad faith, 
while attorney's fees are awarded to make the successful 
plaintiff whole, we rejected the district court's explanation. 
Id. at 236. We declined to remand for assessment of 
attorney's fees, however, finding that the "district court 
obviously intended to both punish State Farm and to make 
the appellant whole, and it believed that the punitive 
damages award accomplished both." Id. 
 
We are unable to determine whether the district court in 
this case had the same intention as the district court in 
Klinger. It appears from its opinions that the district court 
intended that the punitive damages award serve exclusively 
to punish Nationwide and that the attorney's fee award 
serve to compensate Polselli. To the extent that the district 
court did intend the punitive damages award to both 
punish Nationwide and make Polselli whole, the court 
should indicate how much of the punitive damages award 
was attributed to attorney's fees, and it may reduce the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Since the fee petition litigation is separate from the merits 
litigation, 
the court should calculate the fee assessment for this time separately 
from the fee assessment for the time spent litigating the bad faith claim. 
In this case, it is highly unlikely that a contingency enhancement would 
be appropriate for the time spent preparing and litigating the fee 
petition. 
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final assessment of fees accordingly. To avoid the potential 
confusion we faced in Klinger, courts should specify which 
portion of the final award is attributable to punitive 
damages under section 8371(2) and which portion is 
attributable to attorney's fees under section 8371(3). 
 
VI. 
 
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the 
Supreme Court stated that "[a] request for attorney's fees 
should not result in a second major litigation." Id. at 437. 
In Dague, the Supreme Court noted that permitting 
contingency enhancement "make[s] the setting of fees more 
complex and arbitrary, hence more unpredictable, and 
hence more litigable. It is neither necessary nor even 
possible for application of the fee-shifting statutes to mimic 
the intricacies of the fee-paying market in every respect." 
Dague, 505 U.S. at 566-67. Unfortunately, as in a growing 
number of cases in both state and federal court, the real 
issues in this case have been overshadowed by a dispute 
over attorney's fees. We join the Supreme Court in hoping 
that future litigants will be able to resolve amicably the 
amount of a fee. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. While the issue 
of attorney's fees is not necessarily minor, it should remain 
"ancillary and collateral to the underlying controversy. 
Thus, [parties] should refrain from making it a major 
controversy." Windall, 51 F.3d at 1190. 
 
We will remand this case so that the district court may 
assess attorney's fees in a manner consistent with this 
opinion. 
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